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KEY MESSAGES 
• Empirical research lends support to the idea of a 'multi-speed globe' of differen-
tiated (fragmented) constitutionalisation, rather than a fully-fledged integrative 
constitutional process. 'Variable geometry' on the global scale could acknowledge 
irreconcilable d.ifferences between nation states. 
• A prominent candidate for one fragment of this variable global constitution-
alisation is the World Trade Organization (WTO). Constitutionalisation of the 
vVTO means an evolution from constitution to constitutionalism within this 
organisation. 
• A core constitutional issue is the public interest. The concept of 'public interest' 
can be used in various ways. Exception and limitation clauses play an important 
role in the constitutionalist reconstruction of international law. 
• The vVTO is so far only modestly constitutionalised, but could and should be 
further constitutionalised. Further constitutionalisation of the WTO should com-
prise the following reforms: upgrading non-trade concerns such as the environ-
ment in the treaty language itself, liberalisation in trade sectors in which poor 
countries can compete, empowerment of individuals by enabling at least indirect 
participation in secondary law-making (parliamentary dimension) and dispute 
settlement ( direct effect), streamlining of the decision-making and law-inaking 
processes by reviving the legally available options for majority voting and judicial 
review of WTO acts. 
A. Introduction 
Over the past sixty years, international law has developed from a narrow 
system of inter-state norms of coexistence into a broader and organ-
ised'system of cooperation. One ofthe most essential developments has 
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been the growing number of multilateral treaties designed not only to 
set in place legal frameworks but also to promote cooperation in an 
interdependent world. This growing network of treaties has opened up 
non-traditional spheres ofinternational law, touching on nearlyall aspects 
of life of contemporary society. And as international law has developed 
in scope, new actors have been accepted as international legal persons on 
the international scene. 
In recent years, the developments in internationallaw have gained new 
momentum in the debate on global constitutionalisation. 'Constitution-
alisation' is a shorthand term both for the emergence of constitutional 
law within a given legal order and for the spread of constitutionalism as a 
mindset. The concept of constitutionalisation implies that a specific type 
of constitution ( or constitntional law), namely a constitutionalist consti-
tution, can come into being and develop over time. It also implies that 
a legal text (or various legal texts) can acquire (or eventually lose) con-
stitutional properties in a positive feedback process. A text can be more 
( or less) constitution-like and more or less constitutionalist. lt may be, in 
short, a constitution-in-the-mal<ing. Also, constitutionalisation is multi-
factorial. The emerging constitutional profile of the international order 
might be weil developed in one or more areas or even special branches of 
law, but underdeveloped in others. So the process of global constitution-
alisation is not all-encompassing. lt is contingent and path-dependent. 
Patterns of coexistence and cooperation persist even in a generally rnore 
constitutionalised world order. 
The concept of global constitutionalisation has been mainly stud-
ied from a normative angle. 1 First empirical evidence2 points to the 
fact that the macro-process of the cons~itutionalisation of international 
law does indeed comprise subprocesses of micro-constitutionalisation. 
Milewicz and colleagues, 3 studying state commitment to so-called quasi-
constitutional multilateral treaties made between 1945 and 2007 and con-
taining institutional and organisational guidelines for inter-state rela-
tions and fundamental human rights provisions for individuals, provide 
1 See J. Klabbers, A. Peters and G. Ulfstein, The Constitutionalization of International Law 
(Oxford University Press 2009). See for the different perceptions of constitutionalisation, 
T. Cottier and M. Hertig, 'The Prospects of 21st Century Constitutionalism' (2003) 7 Max 
Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 261. 
2 A first empirical attempt at the analysis of global constitutionalisation has been made 
by K. Armingeon and K. Milewicz, 'Compensatory constitutionalisation: A comparative 
perspective' (2008) 22 Global Society 179. 
3 K. 11ilewicz, A. Bächtiger and A. Nothdurft 'Constitutional pluralism or constitutional 
unity? An empirical study of international commitment (1945-2007)' (2010) 36 Review of 
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Figure 1.1 Ratificaticin of quasi-constitutional multilateral treaties according to two 
issue-areas: (1) socio-economic treaties and (2) civil-political and 'rule oflaw' (RoL) 
multilateral treaties. Note: Survival probability refers to the probability that a state does 
not ratify a group of treaties. 
grounds for the idea of a 'multi-speed globe' of differentiated micro-
constitutionalisation, rather than a fully-fledged integrative macro-
constitutional process ( see Figure 1.1 ). 
Against this background, the present chapter focuses on the develop-
ment of one sectoral constitution beyond the nation state, in particular 
within WTO law. The evolution of WTO law presumably constitutes, 
besides that of the EU, a prominent, but controversial case of micro-
constitutionalisation.4 We begin with a clarification of key concepts. We 
then discuss the most important aspects of the constitutionalisation of 
the WTO, notably the problem of democracy. We then focus on one par-
ticular aspect of WTO constitutionalism, namely the 'public interest' in 
WTO law. We argue that exception clauses in international law reflect 
the tensions between national concerns and international goals. From the 
point of view of global constitutionalisation these clauses reflect national 
public interest. We conclude that so far the WTO is only a modestly con-
stitutionalised entity, but should and could be constitutionalised further. 
4 See T. Cottier and M. Oesch, International Trade Regulation: Law and Policy in the WTO, 
The European Union and Switzerland: Gases, Materials and Comments (Bern: Staempfli, 
2005), Part Two 'Constitutional Principles of the vVTO', pp. 346-574. 
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B. Key concepts and methdodological problems 
A constitutionalist vision of the WTO not only considers the world 
trade regime to have a constitution, but also to possess a constitution-
alist constitution-in-the-making. This vision moves significantly beyond 
the older view that the founding acts of international organisations are 
'constitutions'. For instance, long before the creation of the WTO, John 
Jackson had contemplated the 'constitutional strncture of a possible inter-
national trade institution'.5 This vocabulary is in line with the Interna-
tional Court of Justice (ICJ)'s view that '[f]rom a formal standpoint, 
the constituent instruments of international organisations are multilat-
eral treaties ... Such treaties can raise specific problems of interpretation 
owing, inter alia, to their character which is conventional and at the 
same time institutional. '6 So the founding documents of international 
organisations have a hybrid character as treaty-constitution. 7 
This more traditional reading of the international organisations' 
founding documents did not rely on any material, value-laden (con-
stitutionalist) principles, such as the rule of law or fundamental rights, 
but merely on the fact that the founding treaties established institutional 
structures, delineated the competences of the organisation, defined the 
terms of membership and the relations between the members and the 
organisation, regulated the organisations' core functions of law-making, 
conflict resolution and law enforcement, and laid down mies for the 
amendment of the founding treaties themselves. The doctrinal merit 
of this understanding of the law of international organisations was to 
5 J. H. Jackson, World TradeLaw and the Law of GATT, eh. 30: 4 'The constitutional structure 
of a possible international trade institution' (Bobbs Merrill, Indianapolis, 1969), pp. 780-
785. 
6 Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory Opinion, 
ICJ Reports 1996, pp. 66 et seq., para. 19. See in the same sense ECJ, opinion 1/91, 
BBC, ECR 1991-1, 6079, 6102, para. 21. In scholarship notably R. Monaco, 'Le caractE:re 
constitutionnel des actes inst:i.tutifs d'organisations internationales', in Milanges offerts a 
Charles Rousseau: La communaute internationale (Paris: Pedone, 1974), p. 154, emphasis 
added. 
7 This view has not been accepted by the Appellate Body. See AB, Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic 
Beverages ( 4 October 1996) WT /DS8/ AB/R, WT /DS 10/ AB/R, WT/DSl 1/ AB/R, p. 15: 'The 
WTO Agreement is a treaty- the international equivalent of a contract. lt is self-evident 
that in an exercise of their sovereignty, and in pursuit of their own respective national 
interests, the Members of the WTO have made a bargain. In exchange for benefits they 
expect to derive as Members of the WTO, they have agreed to exercise their sovereignty 
according to the commitment they have made in the WTO Agremeent.' 
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overcome the outdated dichotomy between contract and constitution. 8 
But the constitutional view did not introduce a canstitutionalist approach 
to the law of international organisations. 
A constitutionalist approach - by contrast - seeks to identify and 
to advocate the application of constitutionalist principles, such as non-
discrimination, transparency, the rule oflaw, checks and balances, human 
rights protection, and possibly also democracy, to WTO law to improve 
the effectiveness and the fairness of the international trade order. So 
global constitutionalism, as applied to the WTO, has both descriptive and 
prescriptive elements. 
We use 'WTO-constitutionalisation' as a shorthand term both for the 
gradual acquisition of constitutional and constitutionalist features ( which 
overlays, but does not erase the character of the WTO-agreements as 
international treaties) and for the spread of constitutionalism as a mindset 
in analysing the WTO regime. 
The academic objective of WTO constitutionalism is to identify the 
constitutional predispositions and indices in WTO law, to encourage 
reflection on how the process of WTO constitutionalisation might be 
broadened and intensified, and, in doing so, help to vindicate claims to a 
more constitutionalised world trade order. lt not onlypurports to analyse 
the lex lata, but also to argue de lege ferenda. 
This agenda faces objections. The first is that WTO constitutionalism 
is too apolitical or pretends to be above politics and seeks to place eco-
nomic freedoms above politics.9 The constitutionalist reading might be 
a scholarly attempt to channel or minimise politics. This is what Jeffrey 
Dunoff has aptly called 'constitutional conceits'.10 Our response is that 
law and politics should not be viewed as distinct realms, but rather as 
structurally coupled systems. In p~rticular, constitutional law and poli-
tics are mutually constitutive. In consequence, constitutionalism is also 
political, not simply 'an antidote to trade politics' 11 (although it does 
8 See on this dichotomy and its relevance for the debate on the legal nature of the EU 
Treaties, A. Peters, 'The Constitutionalisation of the European Union - Without the 
Constitutional Treaty', in S. Puntscher Riekmann and W. Wessels (eds.), The Making of a 
European Constitution (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2006), pp. 35-67. 
9 R. Howse and K. Nicolaidis, 'Enhancing WTO legitimacy: Constitutionalization or global 
subsidiarity' (2003) 16 Governance 75; J. P. Trachtman, 'The constitutions of the WTO' 
(2006) 17 European Journal of International Law 623. 
10 J. Dunoff, 'Constitutional conceits: The WTO's "Constitution" and the discipline of 
international law' (2006) 17 European Journal of International Law 649, pp. 661---665 and 
p. 672. 
11 Dunoff, above note 10, p. 661. 
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suggest that there is a sphere 'above' everydaypolitics). Paradoxically, but 
in our mind laudably, the call for constitutionalism triggers precisely the 
contestation and politics it is said to pre-empt. The evolutionary dynarn-
ics of constitutionalism lead both to the legalisation of trade politics and 
to a strenger politicisation of trade law. Even if any legalisation of political 
problems (counting constitutionalisation as a special type oflegalisation) 
modifies the debate surrounding these problems by introducing a dif-
ferent, juridical logic, the underlying issues are only partly depoliticised. 
Such a relative depoliticisation of international trade relations is not a dis-
advantage, but a plus. The introduction of legal and even constitutional 
principles contributes to the stability of expectations, legal certainty and 
equal treatment of the relevant actors (WTO Members and economic 
enterprises). 
Both proponents and critics of the constitutionalist reading ofWTO law 
agree that the turn towards constitutionalism is to some exten,t-an effort 
to find a legitimating principle for a system that faces a legitimacy gap: the 
WTO limits governmental policies without finding sufficient acceptance 
by the populations affected.12 However, as a response to the WTO's legiti-
macy crisis, constitutionalism might be fallacious. 13 Is it only a rhetorical 
strategy to invest international Irade law with the power and authority 
that domestic constitutional structures and norms possess?14 Does the 
constitutionalisation discourse serve to close the door against claims that 
the WTO has gone too far? Ifthis were the case, the reification ofthe WTO 
would indeed backfire. lt would only exacerbate the legitimacy crisis or 
stifte appropriate responses to it. lt would also fuel the discontents of 
globalisation if it simply translated economic liberalism into higher law-
irreversible, irresistible and comprehensive. 15 
However, the intrinsic link between constitutionalism and legitimacy 
works in many ways. Constitutionalism may legitimise the international 
trade system, but it l:nay also challenge its legitimacy. On the one hand, the 
<langer is that 'things formerly called institutional are being legitimized 
with the mantle of constitutionalization'. 16 This is unhelpful in analytical 
12 See M. Elsig, 'The World Trade Organization's legitimacy crisis: What does the beast look 
like?' (2007) 41 Journal ofWorld Trade 75; D. C. Esty, 'The World Trade Organization's 
legitimacy crisis' (2002) 1 World Trade Review 7; also R Howse, 'The legitimacy of the 
World Trade Organization', in J. M. Coicaud and V. Heiskanen (eds.), The Legitimacy of 
International Organizations (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2001), pp. 355-407. 
13 Howse and Nicolaidis, above note 9, p. 74 and p. 80. 
14 Dunoff, above note 10, p. 649. 15 Howse and Nicolaidis, above note 9, esp. p. 74. 
16 D. Z. Cass, Constitutionalization ofthe WTO (Oxford UniversityPress, 2005), p. 245. 
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terms and dangerous from a normative perspective. WTO constitution-
alism should not be used apologetically to bestow false legitimacy on 
international trade law. Nor should the complaint of a lack oflegitimacy 
in international trade law undermine the authority of the WTO. Rather, 
WTO constitutionalism should and could help rather than hinder the 
revelation of existing legitimacy deficiencies in world trade law without 
throwing the baby out with the bath water. There is, as Neil Walker put 
it, a 'responsibilising' potential in the constitutional discourse and imag-
ination in the development of a polity.17 Those who wish, for whatever 
motives, to make a plausible claim to constitutional elements in WTO 
law, must at least be seen to take these values seriously. So although con-
stitutionalism may be invoked as a way of closing the debate, in practice 
it often has the opposite effect, namely that of opening up a richer and 
more productive normative debate. The reason is that the tradition of 
constitutionalism remains the best-stocked reservoir from which respon-
sible politics may draw and the most persuasive medium in which these 
politics may be articulated.18 So WTO constitutionalism deploys, and 
this is what we deem crucial, a constructive, not an obstructive, critical 
potential. 
C. How far has the WTObeen constitutionalised to date? 
I. Constitutional principles constraining Members 
One indicator and promotet of rnicro-constitutionalisation is the con-
stitutional rights and principles. Historically, the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade ( GATT) was established on the ground that policies 
made in one country often adversely affect people in other countries who, 
in the absence of any institutional frarnework, have no ability to influence 
those policies. GATT was supposed to provide a forum in which one mem-
ber could challenge the protectionist policies of another member. 19 Such 
protectionist policies are widely seen to result from an undue influence of 
rent-seeking groups whose lobbyism is apt to damage the domestic demo-
cratic processes. Against this background, the WTO's core function is to 
17 N. Wa1ker, 'The EU and the WTO: Constitutionalism in a newkey', in G. de Burca and J. 
Scott (eds.), The EU and the WTO: Legal and Constitutional Issues (Oxford: Hart, 2001), 
pp. 53--54. 
18 Walker, above note 17, p. 57. 
19 P. M. Gerhart, 'Tue WTO and participatory democracy: The historical evidence' (2004) 
37 Vanderbilt Journal ofTransnational Law 897, p. 933. 
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neutralise the domestic power of protectionist interests, and the WTO 
Members have thereby enabled themselves to overcome deficiencies in 
domestic political processes.20 This is a typically constitutional function, 
which is in the domestic realrn served by fundamental rights guarantees 
and by judicial protection through constitutional courts. 
In the current WTO, the traditional trade law principles of most -
favoured nation and national treatment operate against state failure in 
the form of protectionism. These principles are constitutive of the system 
of multilayered governance and thus may be considered as amounting 
to constitutional principles of the trading system.21 They constrain the 
WTO Members and are increasingly viewed as two facets of a consti-
tutional principle of non-discrimination ultimately benefiting the ordi-
nary citizens ( such as importers, exporters, producers, consumers and 
taxpayers) .22 Likewise, the transparency obligations imposed on the WTO 
Members by provisions such as Article X GATT and Articles III and 
VI General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) also seeek to pre-
vent illegitimate protectionism and to that extent serve a constitutional 
function.23 
However, these constitutional principles cannot be enforced by private 
actors. Although private operators currently have the possibility to influ-
ence WTO-related negotiations and also participate informally in WTO 
dispute settlement,24 they have no formal legal standing in this regard. 
Second, private actors are not able to enforce WTO rules in domes-
tic courts, because most domestic courts, the European courts, and a 
WTO panel reject a direct effect of GATT.25 Most irnportantly, that panel 
20 J. McGinnis and M. Movsesian, 'The World Trade Constitution' (2000) 114 Harvard Law 
Review 521. 
21 Cottier and Oesch, International Trade Regulation, above note 4, p. 346. 
22 See E.-U. Petersmann, 'Multilevel judicial governance of international trade requires 
a common conception of rule of law and justice' (2007) 10 Journal of International 
Economic Law 533: 'the WTO guarantees Qf freedom, non-discrimination and rule oflaw 
- by enhancing individual liberty, non-discriminatory treatment, economic welfare, and 
poverty reduction across frontiers - reflect, albeit imperfectly, basic principles of justice.' 
23 P. Delimatsis, International Trade in Services and Domestic Regulations: Necessity, Trans-
parency, and Regulatory Diversity ( Oxford University Press, 2007). 
24 For example the WTO dispute raised by the USA against Japan concerning photographic 
film and paper has for this reason been perceived as a 'Kodak v Fuj{ dispute: Panel, 
Japan - Measures Ajfecting Consumer Photographie Film and Paper (31 March 1998) 
WT/DS44/R. See G. Shaffer, Defending Interests: Public-Private Partnerships in WTO-
Litigation (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003). 
25 Panel, US-Section 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974 (27 January 2000) WT/DS152/R (not 
appealed) para. 7.72: 'Neither the GATT nor the WTO has so far been interpreted by 
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deliberately distinguished the WTO regirne from the EU and the van 
Gend & Laos conception of an autonomous legal order by highlighting 
that 'the GATT /WTO did notcreate a new legal order the subjects of which 
comprise both contracting parties or members and their nationals.' 26 
A different aspect of WTO rights-based constitutionalism is the sug-
gestion to integrale human rights concerns into world trade law, not 
only through the interpretation of existing agreements, but also through 
the building of new common institutions.27 In fact, a constitutionalist 
approach is apt to provide a vocabulary, a theory and institutional build-
ing blocks to satisfy the quest for coherence between trade law and human 
rights law. The rights-based constitutionalist school submits that human 
rights have become guiding principles of international economic law.28 
Proponents suggest endorsing a general maxim of interpretation of the 
GATT obligations ofWTO Members ( and the relevant exception clauses) 
in the light ofhuman rights guarantees.29 
The rights-based constitutionalist reading of WTO law has ( to some 
extent erroneously) been perceived as narrow. lt has been criticised for 
marginalising social rights and environmental principles and for focus-
ing on economic and property rights. Early constitutionalist scholarship 
was therefore criticised as masking a radically economically libertarian 
free-trade agenda. In fact, the old GATT law neglected social and environ-
mental issues and was geared towards negative integration by eliminating 
trade barriers. Today, the Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intel-
lectual Property Rights (TRJPS), Article VI GATS, the Agreement on 
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement) and the Agreement on the 
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement), 
the Antidumping Agreement and the Agreement on Agriculture seek to 
achieve positive integration through common standards, even if very few 
of these standards marginally relate to the environment, and hardly relate 
at all to social aspects. 
GATT/WTO institutions as a legal order producing direct effect [i.e. as creating enforce-
able rights and obligations for individuals].' lt would be better to speak of an 'indirect 
effect' of GATT (para. 7.78). See also CFI, case T-174/00, Biretlnternational SA v. Counci~ 
ECT 2002 II-17, para. 62. 
26 Panel, US-Section 301, above note 25, para. 7.72. 
27 T. Cottier, 'Trade and human rights: A relationship to discover' (2002) 5 Journal of 
International Economic Law 111. 
28 Cottier and Oesch, International Trade Regulation, above note 4, p. 513. 
29 E.-U. Petersmann, 'Time for a United Nations "Global Compact" for integrating human 
rights into the law of worldwide organizations: Lessons from European integration' (2002) 
13 European Journal of International Law 621, pp. 645-46. 
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In defence of constitutionalism, it can be claimed that the constitu-
tionalist reading of WTO law precisely supports the quest for the adop-
tion of such standards. Moreover, trade liberalisation normally triggers a 
demand for positive integration. However, the WTO, in contrast to the 
EU, currently Jacks the institutions and means to complement the ongo-
ing negative integration with positive integration. 30 Also, a !arge part of 
the membership opposes the WTO having any social agenda. And unlike 
the EU, the WTO does not have decision-making structures that easily 
allow for variable geometry. To conclude, the 'constitutional' WTO prin-
ciples addressed towards the WTO Members seem - for the time being -
to be too incomplete to confirm the descriptive claim that the WTO has 
been constitutionalised along these lines. 
II. Democracy 
The democratisation of international organisations is a key element of 
their constitutionalisation.31 F0llesdal argued 'that we find it conceptu-
ally difficult to disentangle legitimacy and democracy: legitimate modes 
of governance must be democratically accountable.' Only democratic sys-
tems that advocate the values of liberty and equality deserve the loyalty 
of their enlightened citizens in modern societies. 32 This is not neces-
sarily applicable to the !arge number of pre-modern societies, which do 
not support these values. However, if a global constitutional order needs 
legitimisation by the citizens in the economically most advanced nation 
states, only democratic rules pertaining to participation (government of 
and by the people) and to policy outputs in the common interest of the 
people (government for the people) may create this legitimacy. 
By implication, a global constitutional order needs a democratic 
decision-making system for producing and developing global constitu-
tional norms, both in general international law and in specific regimes 
such as that of the WTO. However, as convincingly argued by Michael 
Zürn,33 power and resource imbalances impede a system of equal rights 
30 Howse and Nicolaidis, above note 9, pp. 84-5. 
31 Markus Krajewski, 'International organizations or institutions, democratic legitimacy', 
Max Planck Encyclopedia oflnternational Law (2009), para. 25. 
32 A.F0llesdal, 'vVben "commoninterests" arenotcommon: vVhythe "globalbasicstructure" 
should be democratic' (2009) 16 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 585-604. 
33 M. Zürn, 'Institutionalisierte Ungleichheit in der Weltpolitik: Jenseits der Alternativen 
"Global Governance" versus ''American Empire"' (2007) 48 Politische Vierteljahresschrift 
680. 
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in this constitutional order. There are no such rules as 'one individual -
one vote' or 'one nation state - one vote'. It is entirely unclear how 
preferences of states and preferences of individual citizens have to be 
aggregated. lt is also unclear whether all states should have the same 
rights and powers. Same nation states have more duties and rights than 
others. They have different levels of influence on rule formation. They 
are treated differently. Cases in point are the veto rights of the five per-
manent members in the UN Security Council; privileges of the US with 
regard to the International Criminal Court;34 weighted voting rights in 
the World Bank; the different risks of nuclear powers compared to other 
nations with regard to UN interventions; and the fuzziness of procedural 
mies on the international level and diffuse distributions of competencies 
among international organisations, allowing for opportunistic behaviour 
by nation states. Strang nation states have the opportunity of picking 
the international organisation and the sets of constitutional rules that 
are most compatible with domest,ic interests. The global constitution is 
still basically biased in favour of the most powerful countries, and in 
particular of the US. In this context Ulrich K. Preuss argued that the 
principle of sovereign equality of all states may be the first victim of the 
constitutionalisation of international law.35 
/ 
1n conclusion, there is so far no efficient global democratic system 
concerned with the further development of global norms and the control 
of their implementation. Even worse, there are no convincing ideas of 
how such a democratic system - which has to honour the democratic 
principles on the regional, the national and the international levels and 
its interactions - could and should look like. Hopes for a deliberative 
/ 
democracy depend on the absence of distributive conflicts and value con-
flicts - which is hardly realistic. Hopes for a new democracy, which are 
built an non-governmental organisations as agents and representatives of 
the people, depend on some democratic accountability of and equality of 
access to these organisations. At the moment there are no strong empirical 
arguments suggesting that this may be the case. Hence there is no con-
vincing idea of what a workable and legitimate international democratic 
system should look like and which rights and powers should be allocated 
to individuals, regions, private organisations and nation states. On the 
34 UNSC Res 1422 (12 July2002) UN Doc S/RES/1422 and UNSC Res 1487 (12 June 2003) 
UN Doc S/RES/1487. 
35 U. K. Preuss, 'Equality of states -Its meaning in a constitutionalized global order' (2008) 
9 Chicago Journal oflnternational Law 17. 
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international level, there may be increasing changes in favour of the rule 
of the law, but few changes in favour of a combination of rule of law and 
democracy. 
But what is the state of democratisation of the WTO? Here rules and 
decisions are made following procedures which do not include democratic 
elements in any meaningful sense. lt has therefore been argued that, 
because of its inherent lack of democratic legitimacy, WTO law cannot 
serve constitutional functions. 36 The WTO law-making processes can be 
called democratic onlyin a transitive way, to the extent that the democratic 
Members' representatives enjoy a democratic mandate and the domestic 
parliaments have approved the treaties. However, this type of transitive 
democratic legitimacy is rather weak, inter alia because not all WTO 
Mernbers are democracies, and because in those that are democracies 
the role of parliament is basically limited to an affirmation of treaties 
concluded by the executives.37 _, 
III. Rule of law: constitutional principles constraining the WTO 
Constitutionalists point out that the WTO itself is based on the rule of 
law, not only in terms of substance, but al~p in terms of procedure. While 
negotiations still largely follow politics and diplomatic traditions, the 
Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) provides for fair procedures in 
the adrninistration of justice. 38 However, the substantial rules and the dis-
pute settlement procedures currently ouly work to subject the Members, 
not the WTO as an organisation, to the rule of law. A more developed 
rule of law requires that the WTO itself is bound by certain principles. 
Only then are the organisation's powers constitutionally limited. And to 
be effective, these constitutional lirnits must be enforceable. The acts of 
the organisation itself must be subject to judicial review, either by inter-
national or by domestic courts. Currently, ouly the EU possesses this -
in our view - crucial constitutionalist feature. The ECJ and the Court 
of First Instance ( CFI) are competent to control the legality of the acts 
of the organs and institutions themselves. Fully fledged guarantees of 
human rights infringements by EU acts have been ouly gradually granted 
36 M. Krajewski, 'Democratic 1egitimacy and constitutional perspectives ofWTO law' (2001) 
35 Journal ofWorld Trade 167. 
37 See for the problems of a transitive democratic legitimacy of global governance, A. Peters, 
'Dual Democracy', in J. Klabbers, A Peters, and G. Ulfstein, The Constitutionalization of 
International Law ( Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 263-341. 
38 Cottier and Oesch, International Trade Regulation, above note 4, p. 543. 
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in a dialectical process triggered through opposition against European 
claims of authority by the Member States. 39 A parallel process has been 
set in motion with regard to the UN Security Council, whose comprehen-
sive sanctions against Iraq since 1991 and more recent targeted sanctions 
against individuals risk violating social rights, procedural rights and prop-
erty rights. Again, the threat of non-compliance by outside courts might 
push the United Nations to clearly acknowledge that the Security Coun-
cil is bound by human rights Standards, to increase the )evel of human 
rights protection and to create an institution to mo.~itor compliance. In 
the WTO, this dimension of constitutionalisation is completely absent. 
Although it could be argued that certain WTO policies potentially, even 
if ouly indirectly, affect or even infringe social or indigenous rights, espe-
cially in developing countries, these policies are not subject to any human 
rights review. Neither are the relevant standards agreed upon, nor are 
monitoring bodies available. The WTO dispute settlement bodies have 
no jurisdiction over their institutions. This difference between the (quasi-) 
compulsory jurisdiction of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism and 
the EU courts is, from a constitutionalist perspective, crucial. 
IV. (Judicial) constitutionalisation of and through WTO 
dispute settlement 
So far, the most viable aspect of micro-constitutionalisation is the judi-
cialisation of dispute settlement. This trend is in the spotlight of the WTO 
constitutionalisation debate. There are a number of different aspects to 
this. In institutional terms, quasi-compulsory and quasi-judicial pro-
ceedings have been established and progressively entrenched, so that now 
quasi-binding, judgment-like awards are rendered. 
A different constitutional element in dispute settlement is the partici-
pation of non-state actors, notably NGOs, which represent the concerns 
of global civil society. Granting them a voice in the process of judicial 
law-making allows them to influence the international legal process at 
least indirectly, and this constitutes a paradigm shift. However, after the 
Shrimp case, the panels and the Appellate Body- following the criticism 
of the WTO Members - have taken a restrictive posture in this regard, 
39 The criticism has still been raised that the ECJ's human rights protection is rather weak, 
that it gives too much weight to the interests ofEuropean integration, and too generously 
allows human rights restrictions on these grounds. 
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and admit amicus curiae briefs only when they are taken up in the parties' 
submissions.40 
In substance, the case law of the panels and the Appellate Body arguably 
'is beginning to display some characteristics ordinarily associated with 
constitutional case-law'.41 Initially, the role of the panels and the Appellate 
Body corresponded to a contractual setting in which the institutions 
mechanically examined whether state conduct was in compliance with 
the agreements. In contrast, considerations of vertical separation and 
balance of powers, which have shaped domestic standards of review, were 
not overtly present in the context of the WT0.42 The dispute settlement 
institutions theu began to borrow constitutional doctrines, such as the 
proportionality analysis.43 They have begun to take into consideration 
non-Irade issues such as human rights and environmental protection, and 
apply the technique of balancing to determine which of the conflicting 
interests should prevail in the concrete case. Arguably, the conceptual 
development of a more constitutional framework would provide room for 
more nuanced and multilayered standard-of-reviewprinciples.44 Tbomas 
Cottier has called this 'constitutionalism in a modest sense', 'an attitude 
and a framework capable of reasonably balancing and weighing different, 
equally legitimate and democratically defined basic values aud policy 
goals'. 45 
Bnt this vision ofWTO constitutionalism is subject to strong criticism. 
One objection is that by taking the principle of trade liberalisation as 
40 Panel, US-Softwood Lumber(22 March 2004) WT/DS277/R, at 88, n. 75. Here the Panel 
stated that it would 'consider any arguments raised by amici curiaeto the extent thatthese 
arguments were taken up in the written submissions and/or oral statements of any party 
or third parties'. 
41 D. Z. Cass, 'The "constitutionalization" of international trade law: Judicial norm-
generation a.s the engine of constitutionalization' (2001) 13 European Journal of Inter-
national Law 42. 
42 M. Oesch, Standards of Review on vVTO Dispute Resolution ( Oxford University Press, 
2003), p. 29 and pp. 241-242. 
43 See f9r a balancing approach to the 'necessity' requirement of Art. :X:X(d) GATT, which 
grants an a priori equal rank to the conflicting objectives: AB, Mrea - Measures Affect-
ing Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef (11 December 2000) WT/DS161/AB/R, 
WT/DS169/AB/R, para. 162: 'The more vital or important those common interests or 
values are, the ea.sier it would be to accept as "necessary'' a measure designed as an 
enforcement instrument.' 
44 Oesch, Standards ofReview, above note 42, p. 243. 
45 T. Cottier, 'Limits to International Trade: The Constitutional Challenge', in TheAmerican 
Society oflnternational Law (ed.), International Law in Ferment: A New Vision for Theory 
and Practice, Proceedings of the 94th Annual Meeting (Washington, DC, April 5-8, 2000), 
p. 221. 
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a constitutional norm, the trade-off between the obligatiou to liberalise 
and the protection of non-trade concerns inevitably ends in a prefereuce 
for free trade. Competing values enter into the picture only as narrow 
and carefully policed exceptions, and the onus is on the party which 
invokes the exception, say the critics.46 However, an important strand of 
WTO constitutionalism seeks precisely to eo unter this order of priorities. 
From that perspective, the competing values are not just ex~eptions to 
trade liberalisation, bnt are provisions to protect legitirnate policy goals, 
which form an integral part of a well-balanced multilateral trading system 
and which should be acknowledged to have the same status as other 
constitutional principles.47 
Also, WTO constitutionalists are accused of falsely dignifying the judi-
cial balancing process, instead of admitting its political character. When 
a WTO pauel invalidates an environmental protection scheme, constitu-
tionalists niight view this as the enforcement of higher (namely consti-
tutional) law ( of free trade). In reality, however, say the critics, this is a 
political decision by the panel which is presumably illegitimate because 
it replaces the policy balancing of domestic democratic institutions with 
the panel's own policy. 
This objection brings us to the heart of the matter. The entire 'constitu-
tionalisation' process has so far been adjudicative rather than deliberative. 
The WTO's capacityfor legislativeresponseto judicial constitutional engi-
neering is muted, last but not least by the consensus practice. This again 
fuels the fundamental objection against the constitutionalist reading of 
WTO law mentioned above, namelythat this reading condones an impov-
erished, legalist (judicially made), apolitical conception of constitution. 
Our conclusion on the constitutional status of WTO is that the WTO is 
so far only a modestly coustitutionalised entity. 
D. The WTO: private or public interest?48 
In 1992, Kenneth W. Abbott addressed the institutional issues of the GATT 
in terms of'private' and 'public' interests.49 He used the term 'private' to 
46 Howse and Nicolaidis, above note 9, 75. 
47 T. Cottier and M. Oesch, International Trade Regulation, above note 4, p. 428 and p. 540. 
48 See for a comprehensive study of the ideas and notions of 'public interest' and 'common 
good' in international law: S. Peter, 'Public Interest' and 'Common Good' in International 
Law, forthcoming. 
49 K. W. Abbott, 'GATT as a public institution: The Uruguay Round and beyond' (1992) 31 
Brooklyn Journal of International Law 31. 
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refer to the 'particular interests of the individual states'. The terrn 'public' 
was designed to describe the 'comrnon interests of the nations forming the 
world trading comrnunity'. According to Abbott's paper, GATT mernbers 
had misconceived the GATT as 'constituting a private interest cornmunity'. 
By way of contrast, the Uruguay round was about institutionalising a 
'public interest' approach, characterised bythe 'concern for the cornrnon 
interests of the community of trading nations'. 
The WTO came into being in 1995. In the following years, 'public 
interest' groups identified the WTO as the preferred target in their fight 
against a glo balised trade regirne and its undesirable effects. Frorn this 
perspective, the WTO posed a threat to 'public interest' issues and was 
not seen to be a <public interest' organisation. so 
The two uses of 'public interest' show that the term is not a syn-
onym for constitutionalism in international law. Rather, three differ-
ent approaches to 'public interest' should be distinguished, narnely the 
cornmunal approach, the sovereigntist approach and the constitutional-
ist approach. This section will focus on the interpretation of exception 
clauses in international law. These clauses reflect the tension between 
national public interest and international goals. Accordingly, the differ-
ent approaches to public interest are rnirrored in the way these clauses 
are interpreted by states or by international adjudication bodies. lt is sub-
mitted that a constitutionalist understandiug of these clauses rnust accept 
that they reflect national public interests. 
I. The communal approach to public interest 
1. Public interest and private interest 
Abbott used the terrn 'public interest' to sketch the institutional change of 
the old GATT. He proposed that this change should imply a 'significantly ' 
increased role' 51 for.the GATT institutions. Abbott's approach is based 
mainly on a domestic analogy. States are seen to be individual, unitary 
actors which pursue their own self-interest (private interest). On the 
other hand, international organisations adopt a 'public' view when they 
pursue a cornrnunity vision, characterised by its independence frorn the 
party's visions. They are labelled 'public' because they are supposed to 
transcend the individual interests of their rnernbers. According to Abbott, 
50 S. Picciotto, 'Defending the public interest in TRIPS and the WTO', in P. Drahos and R. 
Mayne (eds.), GlobalintellectualProperty Rights(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002). 
51 Abbott, 'GATT as a Public Institution', above note 49, p. 84. 
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the GATT was 'created with a vision of the public good, a set of cornrnon 
goals, principles and norms (designed to restrain national autonomy)'.52 
According to this view, the cornrnunal core of the GATT would lie in the 
restraint of 'national autonorny' for the greater good of enabling trade 
liberalisation. Byway of contrast, the traditional (national) public interest 
'in a borderless world ... has becorne little rnore than a cloak for subsidy 
and protection [and] has no meaningful place'.53 
2. A cornmunal interpretation of Article XX GATT 
Let us test a cornrnunal approach to Article XX GATT. Roughly speaking, a 
communal approach would irnply that the overall interests of the trading 
system prevail over the individual interests of the Mernbers. It is possible 
to see the Tuna Panels in this light. The US Marine Marnmal Protection 
Act of 1972 required a general prohibition of the taking and irnportation 
into the US of marine marnrnals. Under the Act, the importation of 
cornrnercial fish or fish products which resulted in the incidental killing 
of ocean rnarnrnals was prohibited. In Tuna I, Mexico clairned that the 
import prohibition on yellowfin tuna and tuna products was inconsistent 
with Articles III, XI, and XIII GATT. The US argued that the measure 
was covered by Articles XX(b) and (g) GATT. The Panel Report in Tuna 
I expressed the fear that any justification under Article XX GATT rnight 
lead to 'green protectionism'.54 Thus, the Panel considerably reduced the 
scope of this Article by excluding virtually all unilateral rneasures: 
The Panel considered that if the broad interpretation of Article XX(b) sug-
gested by the United States were accepted, each contracting party could 
unilaterally determine the life or health protection policies from which 
other contracting parties could not deviate without jeopardizing their 
rights under the General Agreement. The General Agreement would then 
no langer constitute a multilateral framework for trade among all con-
tracting parties but would provide legal security only in respect of trade 
between a limited number of contracting parties with identical internal 
regulations.55 
52 Ibid. p. 38. 
53 K. Ohmae, The End of the Nation State: The Rise of Regional Economies (London: Harper 
Collins, 1996), p. 64. 
54 D. C. Esty, Greening the GATT: Trade, Environment, and the Future (Washington, DC: 
Institute for International Economics, 1994). 
55 Panel Report, United States - Restrictions on theimports ofTuna ( not adopted) (3 September 
1991) BISD 39S/155 parn. 5.27. 
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Although the Panel Reports on the Tuna cases were never adopted, these 
reports attracted wide attention and marked the beginning of the whole 
'trade and environment' debate. 56 The Tuna Panels suggested a communal 
reading of Article XX GATT which would have favoured the GATT values 
nearly unconditionally over non-trade interests. As a 'public' institution, 
the GATT system would be able to impose its trade values even against 
the 'private' interests of an individual Member. However, this commu-
nal 'public interest' reading of Article XX GATT did not find approval 
outside the trade community, which was blamed for having an 'insider 
understanding'57 of trade. 
In US - Shrimp, the Appellate Body rejected the communal approach 
to the public interest exceptions of Article XX GATT. Measures which fall 
under the scope of paragraph (a) to (j) of that Article were 'recognized 
as exceptions to substantive obligations established in the GATT 1994, 
because the domestic policies embodied in such measures have been rec-
ognized as important and legitimate in character'.58 Furth er, the Appellate 
Body has recognised ever since that it is for the Member to determine its 
own level of protection. However, protectionist measures remain out-
lawed. Members have to implernent these measures in such a way as to 
satisfy the requirements of the chapeau of Article XX GATT. 
II. The sovereigntist approach to public interest 
1. 'Public interest' in limitation clauses and 
general exception clauses 
States are public entities, inhabited by private individuals. However, 
Abbott used the public-private distinction in another way. He implic-
itly compared the behaviour of states to that of individual persons. In the 
international sphere, state autonomy and state sovereignty thus seem to ' 
correspond to the 'private', self-max:imising behaviour of individuals. 
However, opposing 'public interest' to state sovereignty does not reflect 
the use of the term in international law. Neither state autonomy nor state 
sovereignty are opposed to the concept of public interest in international 
56 M. Matsushita, T. J. Schoenbaum and P. C. Mavroidis, The World Trade Organization. 
Law, Practice, and Policy (2nd edn, Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 794. 
57 R Howse, 'The Appellate Body rulings in the Shrimp/Turtle Case: A new legal baseline 
for the trade and environment debate' (2002) 27 Columbiafournal ofEnvironmental Law 
517. 
58 Appellate Body Report, United States - Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products (12 October 1998) WT/DS58/AB/R para. 21. 
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law: quite the contrary. One important use of'public interest' in interna-
tional law is closely linked to state sovereignty. The term is explicitly used 
in Article 8 TRIPS and Article 1 · of the First Additional Protocol of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Article 8 TRIPS allows 
Members to adopt measures necessary 'to promote the public interest in 
sectors of vital importance', whereas the peaceful enjoyment of posses-
sions requires that no one 'shall be deprived of his possessions except 
in the public interest'. 'Public interest' is also an umbrella term for state 
interests such as the protection of public morals, public policy or safety, 
public ( or national) security or the protection ofhuman, animal or plant 
life or health. These interests are frequently invoked in international law 
as treaty exceptions such as Articles XX and XXI GATT and Article XIV 
GATS59 or Article 30 EC. 
2. A sovereigntist interpretation of Article XXI GATT: 
a self-judging obligation 
From a historical perspective, escape clauses, ordre publicreservations60 or 
'vital interest' clauses61 reflect the priority claim of state sovereignty. 62 The 
strong sovereigntist background of these clauses can amount to claims 
that they are 'self-judging'. 'Self-judging' obligations are considered as 
being able to block judicial review. The most prominent example of an 
alleged self-judging obligation is Article XXI GATT, the national security 
exception. Under GATT 1947, several disputes arose under this Article. 
The question whether the mere invocation of Article XXI GATT blocks any 
review process under Article XXIII GATT remained unsettled through-
out the GATT years. 63 Although states no langer contest the jurisdiction 
of panels, recent cases support the view that states prefer to settle dis-
putes which involve national security issues outside the framework of the 
59 See also T. Cottier, P. Delimatsis and N. F. Diebold, 'Commentary an Art. XIV GATS' in R. 
Wolfrum, P.-T. Stall and C. Feinäugle (eds.), Max-Planck Commentaries on World Trade 
Law, Val. 6: WTO-Trade in Services (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2008), pp. 283-328. 
60 Ibid. 
61 M. J. Hahn, 'Vital interests in the law of the GATT: An analysis of GATT's security 
exception' (1991) 12 Michigan Journal of International Law 558. 
62 A. Emmerson, 'Conceptualizing security exceptions: Legal doctrine or political excuse?' 
(2008) 11 Journal of International Economic Law 135. 
63 P. Lindsay, 'The ambiguity of GATT Article XXI: Subtle success or rampant failure?' 
(2003) 52 Duke Law Journal 1279; S. Rose-Ackermannn and B. Billa, 'Treaties and national 
security' (2008) 40 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 467. 
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WTO. 64 By contrast, scholarly writings point to other international treaty 
organs such as the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) or the 
European Court of Justice to show that national security issues are not 
per se outside the realm of judicial review. Indeed, in its very first case, the 
ECtHR established its jurisdiction on Article 15 ECHR, involving the füll 
reviewability of the requirements which allow a state to invoke derogation 
measures.65 It rejected thereby the claim of the Irish Government that 'it 
was for a Government, and for that Government alone, to determine 
when a state of emergency existed and what measures were required by 
the exigencies of the situation.'66 
III. The constitutionalist approach to public interest 
1. International adjudication on sovereigntist clauses 
The ECtHR Lawless ruling has been compared to the seminal judgment of 
Marburyv. Madison in which the US Supreme Court asserted its power to 
review the constitutionality of legislative acts and thus the legitimacy of 
constitutional judicial review. 67 Indeed, the ECtHR has adopted the view 
that the Convention was not merely one international treaty among sev-
eral others but 'a constitutional instrument of European public order 
(ordre public)'.68 Similarly, the constitutionalisation of the European 
Union is closely linked to the ECJ's jurisprudence. Besides the doctrines of 
supremacy and direct effect ofEC law, the Court's case law on the funda-
mental freedoms has significantly contributed to the constitutionalisation 
64 Two disputes have arisen so far under the WTO. In 1996, a dispute arose between the 
EC and the US on the so-called 'Helms-Burton' Act. The dispute was settled bilater-
ally in a Memorandum of Understanding although a WTO panel bad previously been 
estabhshed. European Union - United States: Memorandum of Understanding Concem-
ing the U.S. Helms-Burton Ad and the US. Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (11 April 
1997) 36 ILM 529 (1997). The other dispute involving Art. XXI GATT arose between 
Nicaragua and Columbia. In Nicaragua - Measures ajfeding Imports from Honduras and 
Columbia, Columbia requested the establishment of a panel, challenging a Nicaraguan 
law which imposed sanctions on Columbia and Honduras. The Dispute Settlement Body 
agreed to the establishment of a panel; however, it appears that it was never constituted. 
WTO Dispute Settlement Body: Minutes of Meeting held on 18 May 2000, VvTO Doc 
WT/DSB/M/80 (26 June 2000) parn 40. 
65 Lawlessv. Ireland (App no 332/57) (1961) Series A no. 3 para. 22. 
66 Lawlessv. Ireland (App no 332/57) (1959) Report of the Commission pp. 78-79. 
67 F. Ni Aolain, 'The emergence of diversity: Differences in human rights jurisprudence' 
(1995) 19 Fordham International Law Journal 111. 
68 Loizidouv. Turkey (Grand Chamber) (App no 15318/89) Series A no. 310 para. 75. 
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ofCommunity law.69 Further, much ofthe debate aboutthe constitution-
alisation of the WTO is linked to the strengfhened institutional role of the 
'judicialised' dispute settlement system in general70 or more specifically 
to a suggested approach to the adjudication of Article XXI GATT.71 The 
constitutionalist vocabulary is thus closely linked to the existence of inter-
national adjudication on clauses which enshrine national public iriterest 
concerns. 
2. A constitutionalist interpretation of exception clauses: 
accepting national 'collective preferences' 
A constitutionalist interpretation of exception clauses recognises that they 
reflect 'collective preferences'. The concept of 'collective preferences' was 
introduced by Pascal Lamy in the context ofWTO ]aw as a way in which to 
address the discomfort feit with free trade rules. 72 He suggested introduc-
ing an additional safeguard clause which would allow WTO Members to 
escape trade obligations provided that they pay compensation in order to 
ad just the trade system. The problems of such a 'collective preference' safe-
guard clause are manifold. 73 However, Lamy's term 'collective preferences' 
merits approval because it makes it clear that states are collectivities. In 
a state-based system, national communities are forced to speak with one 
voice and to represent one 'single identity'.74 It is the State 'which has the 
exclusive authority to bind the whole community to international law'.75 
But what is the national interest or the public interest of anational com-
munity? Lamy advocates domestic procedures which should prove the 
genuineness of the collective preferences but does not elaborate on the 
69 A. Peters, Elemente einer Theorie der Vetfassung Europas (Veröffentlichungen des Walther-
Schücking-Instituts für Internationales Recht an der Universität Kiel. Berlin: Duncker & 
Humblot, 2001), pp. 406--408. 
70 Cass, 'The "constitutionalization'' of international trade law' above note 41, 39. 
71 H. L. Schloemann and S. Ohlhoff, '"Constitutionalization" and dispute settlement in the 
WTO: National security as an issue of competence' (1999) 93 The American Journal of 
International Law 424. 
72 P. Lamy, 'The emergence of collective preferences in international trade: Implications 
for regulating globalisation', speech given on 15 September 2004 (available at http://ec. 
europa.eu/ archives/ commission_l 999 -2004/lamy/ speeches_artides/ spla242_en.htm, 15 
April 2009). 
73 S. Charnovitz, 'An analysis of Pascal Lamy's proposal on collective preferences' (2005) 8 
Journal of International Economic Law449. 
7 4 S. Burchill, The National Interest in International Relations Theory (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 
2005), p. 47. 
75 Ibid., p. 55. 
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details of such procedures. Steve Charnovitz has rightly shown the diffi-
culties which arise from this 'piercing of the unitary member'. 76 Although 
the demand for more domestic public deliberation on trade issues merits 
approval, it is difficult to imagine how the WTO could objectively ver-
ify the existence of collective preferences.77 Further, it is difficult to see 
why the domestic procedures should only apply in cases relating to trade 
exceptions and not to the negotiation of trade rules. 78 
The need to verify the genuineness of 'collective preferences' in trade 
law stems from the fear that the national 'public interest' is protectionism 
in disguise and that the concept itself is always hijacked by domestic rent · 
seeking groups. Therefore, international courts engage in a very close 
textual analysis of the different public interest exceptions when they adju-
dicate trade rules. The scope of the exception clauses is interpreted rather 
narrowly79 whereas the scope of those provisions which can be violated 
is interpreted rather widely. In EC law, the scope of Article 28 EC was 
widened to such an extent that the original mies of non-discrimination 
have developed into rules of de-regulation. However, the widening of the 
scope of Article 28 EC has occurred alongside the introduction of addi-
tional public interest defences, namely the 'mandatory requirements'80 
or the 'overriding requirements of general public importance'. 81 These 
court-made exceptions are interpreted in a flexible way that has allowed 
the Court to acknowledge additional public interests such as consumer 
protection,82 environmental protection83 or human rights protection.84 
No additional public interest defences have been introduced so far in WTO 
law and no exceptions have been developed which could be compared to 
76 Charnovitz, 'An analysis of Pascal Lamy's proposal an collective preferences', above note 
73, p. 456. 
77 Ibid., p. 458. 78 Ibid., p. 456. 
79 See for example: Panel Report EC - Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Pref 
erences to Developing Countries (1 December 2003) WT/DS246/R paras. 7.207-
7.210. The panel found that the European drug arrangements were not covered by 
Art.XX(b). 
80 ECJ, Case 120/78 Rei,ve-ZentraleAGv. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein [1979] 
ECR 649 para. 8. 
81 ECJ, Case C-34/95 Konsumentombudsmannen (KO) v. De Agostini [1997] ECR I-3843 
para. 46. 
82 ECJ, Case 120/78 Rewe-ZentraleAGv. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein [1979] 
ECR649. 
83 ECJ, Case 302/86 Commission v. Kingdom ofDenmark [1988] ECR 4607 paras. 8-9. 
84 ECJ, Case C-112/00 Bugen Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte undPlanzügev. Repub-
lik Österreich [2003] ECR I-5659 para 74. 
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the concept of 'mandatory requirements'. 85 Therefore, scholars argue for 
broad interpretations of the various subparagraphs of Article XX GATT. 
Article XX(a) GATT, in particular, which provides for the protection of 
public morals, was considered to allow for the inclusion of concerns such 
as the protection ofhuman rights.86 
N. Preliminary outlook 
Far from saying that the international adjudicating bodies are constitu-
tional courts, it can be submitted that their case law on 'public interest' as 
enshrined in the relevant exceptions or limitation clauses offers impor-
tant insight into the legitimacy of international law adjudication. When 
exception clauses are interpreted in a communal way, the overall 'pub-
lic interest' of the treaty system prevails almost unconditionally over the 
'public interest' issues which are addressed in these clauses. When they are 
interpreted in a sovereigntist way, the definition of 'public interest' is left 
entirely up to the individual parties to the treaty. This may pose a threat 
to the treaty system because the exception 'ceases tobe a rule oflaw and 
becomes a maxim of politics'.87 What is needed, thus, is a way to address 
the clauses which mediates between the two extremes. European Courts, 
both the ECtHR and the ECJ, refer to an explicit or implied doctrine of 
'margin of appreciation'. This doctrine mitigates the possible impacts of 
international law on the national public interest, thereby strengthening 
the Court's own politicallegitimacy.88 
The constitutionalist reconstruction of international law should not 
claim that international law and international institutions always pro-
mote 'public interests', whereas States merely act in their own narrowly 
defined seif-interest. The constitutionalist approach to public interest in 
international law takes into account that public interest exceptions refer to 
interests which are in principle recognised as legitimate interests of collec-
tive actors. Nevertheless, the decision as to whether a Member's measure 
85 Cottier, Delimatsis and Diebold, 'Commentary on Art. XIV GATS', above note 59, 
pp. 283~328. 
86 S. Charnovitz, 'The moral exception in trade policy' ( 1998) 38 Virginia Journal of Interna-
tional Law 689; N. F. Diebold, 'The morals and order exceptions in v\TTO Law: Balancing 
the toothless tiger and the undermining mole' (2008) 11 Journal oflnternational Economic 
Law43. 
87 H. Lauterpacht, Private Law Sources and Analogies of International Law (London: Long-
mans, Green & Co., 1927), p. 169. 
88 D. Shelton, 'The boundaries of human rights jurisdiction in Europe' (2003) 13 Duke 
Journal of Comparative & International Law 95, p. 135. 
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is covered by the exception is left to an international adjudication body 
which is charged with the interpretation of these exceptions. 
E. Policy recommendations 
Further constitutionalisation could be realised by political actors and 
promoted by doctrinal arguments along the following lines. 
I. Constitutional substance 
The libertarian inclination of the nascent WTO constitution should be 
rectified by strengthening the legal relevance of non-trade issues such 
as environmental and social concerns. The constitutional principle of 
solidarity should be implemented by promoting liberalisation in sectors 
in which poor countries can compete. 
The so-called 'new, new issues' of the WTO, namely the rule of law, 
good governance, corruption, corporate responsibility, exchange rates and 
migration, should be promoted, because these are all issues that deserve 
the labe! 'constitutional' on account of their fundamental nature, and are 
indeed typically dealt with in state constitutions. 
Furthermore, it would be appropriate to strengthen the WTO consti-
tutional restraints on Members. This means that direct access of private 
(business) actors to WTO dispute Settlement and the functionally equiv-
alent raute, namely traders' access to domestic courts with the complaint 
that WTO law has been breached by a Member, should be re-examined. 
II. Access of private actors to WTO dispute settlement and 
to domestic courts 
Direct access of private parties to the WTO dispute settlement insti-
tutions would liberale business actors from the tutelage of their gov-
ernments, which are often reluctant to institute WTO proceedings. The 
governmental choice of whether to bring or not to bring a particular 
WTO case to the dispute settlement forum is often not guided by the 
importance and meritoriousness of the issue, but is influenced by diplo-
matic considerations on the general relations with another country, by 
a desire to leave a legal question undecided, or by the lobbying power 
or weakness of an industry sector. These policy considerations neglect 
the rule of law and they lead to unequal treatment of business actors. 
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The privatisation ofWTO dispute settlement would remedy these prob-
lems and lead to better respect for the rule of law and equal protection. 
Because self-interested commercial actors have a strong incentive to sue, 
it would moreover strengthen the GATT by terminating underenforce-
rnent. lt would finally relieve governments of the burden of political 
tensions. 
But such privatisation may be a step too far. Given that the military 
option is largely foreclosed, economic and trade regulation is nowadays 
the main foreign policy instrument of gövernments. 89 The regulation 
of trade flows is intrinsically dualist: it concerns both the public and 
private interests. Governments litigating before the WTO dispute settle-
ment institutions are therefore often counselled bythe interested business 
actors. This duality should be more clearly acknowledged and regulated 
under due consideration for the public and private concerns at stake. For 
instance, one could question the extent to which the interest in business 
secrecy, which is protected through the non-disclosure ofbusiness confi-
dential information by the litigating states parties,90 really outweighs the 
public interest in transparency and publicity of the WTO proceedings. 
Ultimately, it must be-kept in mind that the public and the private interests 
at stake need not coincide. The appropriate constitutional design ofWTO 
dispute settlement therefore seems not tobe to remove it completely from 
governmental control, but to uphold it as a basically inter-state system 
while greatly increasing and formalising the participatory opportunities 
of private actors. 
In parallel, the direct application of suitable WTO rules should be 
reconsidered.91 Admittedly, the direct application ofWTO law risks giv-
ing undue power to domestic courts to the detrirnent of the Members' 
political branches. Also, as long as WTO law has not fully integrated 
legitimate policy concerns other than trade liberalisation, the 'unfiltered' 
application of WTO law by domestic courts may threaten those policy 
89 T. Cottier, in a panel discussion moderated by P. C. Mavroidis, 'Is the WTO dispute 
settlement mechanism responsive to the needs of traders? Would a system of direct 
adjudication by private parties yield better results?' ( 1998) 32 Journal ofWorld T'rade 14 7, 
p. 154. 
90 Panel, Canada - Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft (14 April 1999) 
WT/DS70, para 9.68 and Appellate Body, Canada - Measures Ajfecting the Export of 
Civilian Aircraft (2 August 1999) WT/DS70/AB/R, paras. 141 et seq. 
91 See T. Cottier, 'A theory of direct effect in global law', in A. von Bogdandy, P. C. Mavroidis, 
and Y. Meny (eds.), European Integration and International Co-ordination. Studies in 
Transnational Economic Law in Honour of Claus-Dieter Ehlermann (The Hague: Kluwer 
Law International, 2002), pp. 99-123. 
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concerns.92 Finally, it can be argued that the development of WTO law 
by domestic judges, triggered by private claimants, must be accompanied 
( and eventually corrected) by WTO rule-making processes in which these 
private actors can participate. 
Ultimately, the constitutionalist agenda encourages a more ready accep-
tance of the direct effect of suitable provisions ofWTO law, because direct 
effect would enable the domestic judiciary to check the Members' exec-
utives, which otherwise enjoy unfettered discretion in applying the rules 
which were actually designed to restrain these very actors. This is the 
classic theme of constitutionalism, which seeks to contain political power 
in order to safeguard the autonomy of the individual. From a constitu-
tionalist perspective, the enactment of a WTO decision that would define 
the criteria of direct applicability, clarify who is entitled to invoke direct 
effect, and explicitly allow the direct effect of WTO provisions satisfy-
ing the established criteria, is recommended. Provisions suited for direct 
effect are in essence those whose concretisation can, under a theory of 
delegation informed by the rule of law, be legitimately delegated to a 
judge.93 But because the application of those WTO norms by domestic 
courts bears the risk of diverging case law, the admission of direct effect 
would ideally be accompanied by a system of referral to the international 
adjudicative organs for preliminary rulings in order to harmonise the 
interpretation ofWTO law. 
III. A multilevel judiciary 
A constitutionalist approach to the judiciary permits us to appraise the 
WTO dispute settlement institutions and the national courts as forming 
one multilevel judiciary. From this perspective, the activity at both levels 
should be informed by constitutionalism and the rule of law, and the 
intensity of judicial review should be adapted to the degree of integration 
of their subsystem.94 The WTO panels' attitude would need to shift to a 
more constitutionalist approach which would allow for a more refined 
balancing between market access rights and other legitimate policy con-
cerns. In contrast, national courts should adopt a stricter standard of 
review for scrutinising the trade policy decisions of their executives. 
92 Cottier, 'Direct effect', above note 91, pp.114-115. 
93 Ibid., pp. 118-119. 
94 T. Cottier and P. Mavroidis, 'Concluding remarks', in T. Cottier and P. Mavroidis (eds.), 
The Role of the Judge in International Trade Regulation: Experience and Lessons for the WTO 
(Ann Arbor: l\11ichigan University Press, 2003), pp. 349, 353. 
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IV. Political and legal accountability 
In institutional and procedural terms, the accountability ofWTO activities 
should be enhanced. As far as legal accountability is concerned, judicial 
review of acts of the institutions themselves must be made available in the 
longrun. In terrns ofpolitical accountability, the involvement ofnon-state 
actors in the elaboration of 'secondary' trade law and dispute settlement 
should be further strengthened in order to increase transparency and to 
introduce elements of participatory democracy. Concerns about NGOs' 
legitimacy and accountability and about ineffectiveness of procedures 
could be allayed by an accreditation scheme which must be as far as 
possible depoliticised. 95 Besides, a parliarnentary dimension could be 
introduced into the WT0.96 This should be clone both on the national 
level (liaising better with national parliaments), and on the international 
level by creating an informalnetwork of national parliaments which might 
in the lang run lead to a standing parliamentary assembly. Members which 
do not have a parliament could be allowed to send other officials to these 
meetings. 
V. Law- and decision-making 
Finally, and most importantly, we face inertia in the creation of primary 
WTO law (i.e. the arnendment of the WTO treaties themselves97 ) and 
secondary law.98 More effective WTO rule-making and decision-making 
95 See the Guidelines for arrangements on relations with Non-Governmental Organiza-
tions, WT/L/162, Decision of 18 July 1996. WTO Director-General Supachi Panitchpakdi 
established two informal advisory bodies to the WTO Secretariat in 2003, as a platform 
for dialogue between the DG and business organisations and NGOs. Tue subsequent 
Director-General disbanded these informal bodies. See P. van den Bossche, 'NGO involve-
ment in the WTO: Acomparative perspective' (2008) 11 Journal oflnternational Economic 
Law717. 
96 Proposals along these lines are supported by the IPU and the European Parliament, 
but are opposed by the USA and many developing countries. See the parliamentary 
conference on the WTO convened by the European Parliament and IPU calling for 
a parliamentary dimension to the WTO (Final declaration of 18 February 2003). See 
G. Shaffer, 'Parliarnentary Oversight of WTO-Rulemaking? The Political, Normative, 
and Practical Contexts' (2004) 7 Journal of International Economic Law 629; E. Mann, 
'Parliarnentary dimensions in the WTO - More than just a vision?' (2004) 7 Journal of 
International Economic Law 659. 
97 See Ön a 'two tier approach' to negotiations which would allow the influx of outside ideas 
into WTO negotiations, T. Cottier, 'Structural reform ofthe WTO' (2007) 10 Journal of 
International Economic Law 497, pp. 505-506. 
98 See on this problem Y. Bonzon, M. Elsig, M. Foltea, T. Messerli and A. Ziegler, 'Reflections 
on Modes of Decision-Making in the WTO', Chapter 2 in this volume. 
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is needed for two reasons. First, only treaty revision can bring about 
positive social and environmental integration, which is not yet ingrained 
in the treaties and which can therefore not be effected by the judiciary 
alone. Second, the possibility of a legislative response to adjudication is 
required to eo unter the problem of a presumably illegitimate government 
of judges, and to enhance the balance of powers within the WTO. 
The current WTO practice for decision-making and rule-making relies 
on the consensus principle (footnote 1 ofthe WTO Agreement). Although 
Article IX WTO Agreement provides for majority voting if a consensus 
is not reached (with decisions to be adopted upon a simple majority of 
the votes cast), such voting does not take place. The current consensus 
practice is ineffective because it risks cementing the status quo. From a 
constitutionalist perspective, it is even more important that this practice is 
also illegitimate. lt is undemocratic because it allows one WTO Member 
to tyrannise the others, and allows a small minority or one Member 
to block collective action.99 lt is also anti-egalitarian, because it gives 
more weight to the positions of Members who are less likely to give 
up their resistance, and these tend to be the bigger and richer ones. 100 
Finally, the resulting unavailability of a legislative response to the (quasi-) 
judicial decisions leaves the dispute Settlement institutions uncontrolled 
and thereby undermines the legitimacy of the WTO judiciary. 
One possible reform that would enhance the effectiveness and legit-
imacy of decision-making would be the introduction of weighted 
voting.101 Such a reform would make transparent the undeniable prepon-
derance of the powerful Members, while still being more acceptable to the 
powerful Members than a system of equal votes. However, it is exceedingly 
difficult to identify the appropriate factors for weighting the votes. From 
a radically democratic perspective, the decisive criterion would have to 
be the size of population in order to represent more fairly the world's 
citizens who are the ultimate unit of global democracy. But other factors 
reasonably related to the mandate of the WTO, such as shares of world 
trade and openness of the markets, also seem relevant. 
99 Cf. Francisco de Vitoria 'On Civil Power', in Political Writings [1528], ed. by A. Pagden 
and J. Lawrence (Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 1-44, p. 30 (para. 14). 
100 C D. Ehlermann and L. Ehring, 'Decision making in the world trade organization: Is the 
consensus practice of the world trade organization adequate for making, revising and 
implementing rules on international trade?' (2005) 8 Journal oflnternational Economic 
Law 51, p. 66. 
101 T. Cottier and S. Takenoshita, 'The balance of power in \\TTO decision-making: Towards 
weighted voting in legislative response' (2003) 59 Aussenwirtschaft 171. 
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An alternative strategywould be to change the decision-making prac-
tices without formally amending the decision-making rules. The first 
option along this route is to eliminate the taboo against voting, and 
thereby revive the legally available possibility of voting. This 'shadow' of 
voting would probably induce Members to give up their veto more often 
and would thus facilitate consensual decision making. 102 Another possi-
bility would be to revitalise the so far underused rule 33 of the various 
WTO bodies' Rules of Procedure.103 These rules state thatwhen consensus 
is not reached in councils, committees, and other subordinate bodies, the 
decision should be moved up to the General Council. Finally, the option 
of authentic interpretation under Article IX(2) WTO Agreement could 
be used more often. 104 A decision defining the authentic interpretation 
of any WTO law provision can be taken by the Ministerial Conference 
and the General Council with the votes of three-quarters of the Members 
and will bind all WTO Members. While Article IX(2) WTO Agreement 
states that authentic interpretation must not undermine the amendment 
provisions of Article X WTO Agreement, this limit still leaves consider-
able leeway for fine-tuning the WTO pr_ovisions, and also for correcting 
an interpretation given by a panel or Appellate Body. While the principal 
constitutional challenges for the WTO lie in its rule-making and decision-
making, we submit that the WTO could and should be constitutionalised 
further along the proposed lines. 
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